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vs. 
GOHANN J. ALFRED KRUMS, 
Defendant in District Court 
Divorce Action, Appellant. 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mother and father of the above named child were 
plaintiff and dPfendant respectively in a divorce action 
filed in thP District Court for \Veber County in October, 
l9G2, file number 39845. Plaintiff sought custody of the 
only issue of tlw marriage, the above named child born 
,Ju]y l 8, 1956. An order to show cause was issued and 
aftt>r hearing, an order dated October 9, 1962 was entered 
awarding cUJstody of said child to the mother. The order 
made after hearing contained the following language. 
Paragraph 3 : 
''That said parties be referred to the Juvenile 
Court for the purpose of having the same make an 
investigation of the welfare of said issue and that 
said parties abide by any order or directive of the 
Juvenile Court. That said referral be made with-
in two days of this order." 
There appears to be no record of any investigation made 
by the Juvenile Court at that time. 
On April 1, 1963, the father made an affidavit claim-
ing neglect of said child and an order to show cause issued 
requiring the appearance of the mother on the 8th of 
April, 1963. A minute entry made April 15, 1963, indi-
rates a hearing was had on the order to show cause and 
the Court "orders the rhild transferred to the father dur-
ing the day and transferred to the mother during the 
weekend." 
Trial of the divorce action was had on May 17, 1963, 
with the mother being awarded the divorce and custody 
of said child with visitation rights in the defendant. Said 
decree was signed the 17th day of July, 1963. 
In November of 1963 the father filed his petition to 
modify the decree awarding him custody of said child and 
for the issuance of an order to show cause. Hearing was 
had on that petition on the 9th of December, 1963, in the 
District Court with the Court's order entered thereon pre>-
viding in part as follows: 
''The Court further admonishes the parties hereto 
that the Court will not consider a change of 
custody of said child until the child is 10 years 
of age· unless there is a serious breach of conduct 
or change of circumstances." 
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Paragraph 2 : 
''The Court hereby orders that there will be no 
change of custody of Arthur Krums or any modi-
fication of the decree herein." 
The appellant filed a second petition to modify the custo-
dy provisions of the divorce decree on the 17th of May, 
1966 pointing out that said child would be 10 years of age 
on .July 18, 1966. At a hearing held on the 23rd of May, 
1966, the Court granted the request of the respondent to 
take said minor child to Germany for a visit and further 
ordered "the Court will not consider change of custody 
at this time." Said order was signed the 25th of May, 
1966. 
By the affidavits of the respondent, the minor child, 
ancl the appellant, said minor child ran away from the 
n~spondent to Ogden Canyon along a mountain road and 
finally to the home of the appellant. Th(~ appellant kept 
the child from school and from the respondent, prompting 
the District Court .Judge to issue to law enforcement of-
fieers a pick up order for said child. 
On the 2Gth day of 1fay, 1966, a petition was filed 
by the father seeking temporary custody of said child. 
Hearing on this petition was heard on the 6th day of 
June, 1966, with the Court minute entry thereon reading 
as follows: 
"The Court awards the Juvenile Court custody of 
the minor child and they are to make such orders 
as they see fit." 
Counsel's written order covering the hearing on June 
fi, 196fi, was signed by the District Judge ·wahlquist on 
thE:" 14th day of October, 1966. The findings of fact 
entered found said child is: 
"probably an early psychopath with a total dis-
respect for the truth. 
2. 1That the Defendant instilled in his child a fear 
of the Country of Germany, and that the child mav 
never return therefrom, and poisoned the mind df 
the child on the issue of custody, which was for-
bidden under the Divorce Decree. 
3. That the defendant has secreted his son 
' Arthur Krums, in violation of this Court's order 
and has done so since l\fay 23rd, 1966. 
4. That there were allegations on the part of the 
child of physical cruelty by the mother. That 
the Court finds no independent evidenee thereof, 
and specifically makes no Finding of Fact or 
Conclusion of Law.", 
and concluded as follows : 
"l. That the Petition for Temporary Custody iR 
hereby referred to the .Juvenile Court for further 
investigation and a determination, under the Utah 
Code Annotated section 55-10-78 that the bailiff is 
to take immediate custody of said minor child and 
transport same to the Juvenile Court. 
2. That the Defendant poisoned the mind of the 
minor child and instilled a fear of the Country of 
Germany, and a subsequent return therefrom, and 
is forthwith held in contempt. 
3. That the Defendant hai; secreted the where-
abouts of Arthur Krums, since the day of May 
23rd, 1966, and is forthwith held in contempt of 
court." 
Hearings were had in the Juvenile Court of the 
First Distriet in and for Weber County, Utah, on the 
father's petition for temporary custody of said child on 
the 5th day o.f July, 1966, but were recessed to the 16th 
day of August, 1966, to permit the parents and child to 
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get a psychological evaluation. 
On July 18, 1966 between the July 5 and 16th hear-
ing before the Juvenile Court, said child had attained 10 
years of age. He told the probation officer, Mrs. Dale, 
that he wanted to go with his father, T-6. 
The findings of fact made by the Juvenile Court 
recite that said child: 
''is bordering on an emotional breakdown. 
2. Said Arthur Krums does not feel secure with 
either parent. 
3. Said Arthur Krums is developing no emo-
tional attaehments." 
and refers to the emotional problems of the parents. 
The Com·t's order entered thereon, ordered: 
''the care, custody, and control of said Arthur 
Krums be with and the same is hereby awarded 
to the natural mother, Maria Magdelene Krums, 
subject to the protective supervision of the De-
partment of Public vVelfare. 
It is further ordered that the natural father's 
visitation rights be limited to every other week-
end, provided, however, if the father can show it 
would be in the interests of said Arthur Krums 
that his visitation rights be increased, the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare can relax and increase said 
visitation rights." 
Said order further provided that the matter be continued 
until the 27th day of February, 1967, at 2 :00 p.m. 
The custody award made by the Juvenile Court after 
]waring on said petition is the matter of appeal to this 
Court. 
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ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT I 
Appellant's Point I is the claimed error of the Court 
in failing to give consideration and weight to the child's 
preference. 
A search of the transcript and the findings of fact 
made, fails to reveal that the Court at any plooe indicated 
that the child's expressed preference was not to be given 
any weight or consideration. At T-9, the Court questioned 
the conclusion of the probation officer, Mrs. Dale, favor-
ing custody with the mother in view of the child's choice 
to be with his father. The father's counsel advised the 
Court at T-17 of the boy's preference and of this Court's 
ruling in the Smith case. At T-26, Mrs. Dale indicated 
that the boy is 10 years of age and desired to be with his 
father. At 'T-35, the Court asked the question, "He has 
indicated, at least on two occasions that he would rather 
live with his father '1' From this question and other 
testimony indicated, it is evident that the Court was 
aware that it was the boy's preference to be with his 
father. 
Lacking comment from the Court, one can only 
speculate what weight was given to this expressed prefer-
ence. To conclude that the Court failed to give consider-
ation and weight to this preference when fully aware of it 
would appear to be without merit. 
Appellant's Point l may claim that the J uvenill' 
Court was bound under Sections 30-3-5 and 10, and the 
Smith case, to make the child's election determinative on 
the issue of custody. 
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Section 30-3-10 has been held to apply only to cases 
of separation and not cases of divorce. See Sampsell vs. 
Holt, 202 P 2d 550, 115 Utah 73, Johnson vs. Johnson, 
7 Utah 2d 263, 323P.2d16. 
Respondent finds no fault with appellant's reference 
to Wallick vs. Vance and as set out in Johnson vs. John-
son, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323P2nd18 agrees that the expressed 
preference should be given weight and consideration as 
one of the faetors in determining custody. 
Appellant cites Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386 
P 2d 900 and the interpretation made in that case of sec~ 
tion 30-3-5 UCA as being in point in the present appeal 
The Smith case holds that at the time a divorce de-
cree is being entered and questions of custody being de-
termined it is mandatory that the Court P.ward the custo-
dy of children who have attained the age of 10 years to 
the parent of their expressed preference without regard 
to general welfare considerations. 
The Smith case is not authority for the proposition 
that the District Court, in a custody hearing subsequent 
to the entry of the divorce decree, must award custody 
of a child having attained the age of 10 years according 
to his expressed preference regardless of general wel-
fare eonsiderations. Attention is directed to the last 
sentenee of sPCtion 30-3-5 where the words "reasonable 
and proper,'' are used in referenee to imbsequent changes 
or new orders. 
The Smith eases does not hold that the Juvenile 
Court, hearing a eustody award case of an emotionally 
disturbed run away 10-year-old child, subsequent to the 
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entry of the divorce decree, is under mandate to, inde-
pendent of welfare considerations, award custody accord-
ing to a child's expressed preference. 
The findings of fact of the Juvenile Court in this 
case indicate this is a child whose "condition is such as to 
endanger his own welfare" as provided in section 55-10-
77 (2b & 2c) and also one where jurisdiction is given 
under 55-10-7'7 section 4 and is thus a child whose custody 
should be determined by tlw provisions of the .Juvenile 
Comt act of 1965. 
lt is noteworthy that an unusual problem appeared 
to exist in the child's welfare hy the orders made hy thr 
District Court. For example, the Court's referral to thr 
Juvenile Court at the time of the initial order to show 
cause hearing and the orders made December 9, 1963 dir-
ecting that the Court will not consider a custody change 
or modification of the decree as to the custody and a 
similar order made on the 23rd of May, 1966. 
The action of the appellant in hiding the child, the 
poisoning the mind of the child, in insisting on damning 
the mother, in refusing to take the the psychological test 
recommended by the 'Court may have brought the Court 
to the conlusion that the father was unfit to have the 
child's custody and even under the Smith case, not entitled 
to the 10 year old child's custody. 
A review of the provisions of the ,Juvenile Court act 
of 1965 wherein provision is made for a Juvenile Court 
Commission, advisory committees, an investigative staff, 
social studies, medical and psychiatric examination indi-
cate a legislative intent to have r·nstody questions deter-
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mined by the Juvenile Court. The provisions of 55-10-78 
providing that the District Court may at any time decline 
to pass on a question of custody and certify that ques-
tion to the Juvenile Court together with a concurrent 
jmisdiction with the District are indicative of this legisla-
tive intent. 
The Juvenile Court act of 1965 was enacted subse-
quent to the decision in the Smith case and at no place 
in that act is there any expression that the Juvenile Court 
in any custody matter, regardless of the origin of its 
jurisdiction, was bound by expressed preference over 
welfare considerations in determining the question of 
rustody. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT II 
In this point the appellant complains of a denial of 
the right o.f cross Pxamination of witnesses and denial 
of access to the psychologist's report. 
The Juvenile Court in the July 5 hearing suggested 
that both parents and the boy get a psychological evalu-
ation and recessed further hearing on the case until 
August 16 to permit this to be done. When the hearing 
of August 16 began, the boy and mother had obtained a 
psychological evaluation which was apparently in the 
Court's possession. The fa th er did not get a psychological 
evaluation as suggested by the Court. 
It is apparent from reading T-23 and 24 that both. 
the apellant and the Court desired the presence of the 
examining psychologist. Appellant's counsel said, ''I 
would like, your Honor, to have the opportunity of 
examining the psychologist. I haven't seen his report and 
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nothing at all of his findings." The Court at 'T-23: ''Mrs. 
Dale, I'm curious. Why isn't the psychologist going to 
be here?" After comm en ts from opposing counse 1; "It 
wasn't our understanding that the docitor had to be here, 
your Honor." The Court observed: "This is true, but the 
Court may have some questions of whoever is making . 
. . . " Again at the top of T-24, the Court notes'' ... , but 
a recommendation in this matter would probably be pre-
sented formerly (formally?) to the Court to give an op-
portunity for the Court to make further inquiry and also 
Counsel can clarify the diffieulties that it may have in 
understanding why the recommendation was made.'' Only 
when Mrs. Dale indictaed that her eonclusion was ind('-
pendent of the psychologieal test did the Court permit hPr 
to give her conclnsion8. 
Counsel did not ask for a recess or n continuance to 
secure the presence of the psychologist nor a subpot>na 
to produce him. Section 55-10-87 subparagraph 6 pro-
vides that a parent or guardian shall he entitled to the 
issuance of compulsory proeess for the attendance of wit-
nesses on his own behalf or on behalf of the child. The 
CoUJrt's inquiry as to why the psychologist was not pres-
ent suggests that such a request would have been granted. 
AppeUant's counsel appears to have cross examined 
all of the witnesses who were called. 
While it appears that the psychologi,cal evaluations 
had some importance as suggested by counsel in page 8 
of his brief, at no place in the transcript does tlwre ap-
pear a demand for a eopy nor any objection to the Court 
receiving and consid1>ring the psychological evaluations 
made of the mother and tht> child. 
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8ection 55-10-96 provides for the use of written 
reports and other material relating to the child's mental, 
physical, and social history and condition, but provides 
that the Court may require the person supplying the 
report to appear as a witness. 
Respondent agrees as contended by the appellant 
that the right of cross examination of witnesses should 
be preserved but cannot agree that such right was denied 
the appellant when he made no request of the Court for 
an opportunity to produce the psychologist nor demanded 
a ropy of the psychologist's reports on the mother and 
rhild . Nor does it appear that he can complain of the 
''disadvantaged" position in which he found himself be-
fore the Court as to the psychologist's evaluations when 
he refused to have such evaluation for the assistance of 
the Court. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT III 
Appellant complains that the Court erred in relying 
upon the recommendations of Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan. 
A sear,ch of the transcript and findings of fact failed to 
reveal what reliance the Court placed upon their testi~ 
mony. It ma.y be the Court did not find theeonclusions 
they made any more valid than the appellant believes 
them to be. 
The Court at T-51 and 52 comments on the evidence, 
and does not indicate that he relied upon the testimony of 
either Mrs. Dale or Miss Bevan. At T-52 the Court does 
note: 
"The Court is faced with this proposition. The 
Court knows quite a bit about the mother, but 
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nothing about the father except what I have been 
able to observe on the witness stand. So based on 
the information that has been presented to the 
Court, the Court is going to award custody of the 
child to the mother." 
There being no evidence as to the reliance, if any, 
the Court placed upon the recommendations, the respond-
ent urges that this point is without merit. What is evi-
dent is that the Court in lacking the psychological evalu-
ation suggested by the Court, of the father, knew, ''noth-
ing about the father" and acted on the information pre-
sented to the Court. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
NOT BE DISTURBED. 
Hearings concerning the custody of this child were 
before the District Court on the following occasions: 
October 1962, when custody was awarded to the 
mother after hearing on a preliminary order to show 
ramie. 
April 1963, after which custody was awarded to the 
father during the day time and to the motlwr during 
the weekend. 
May 1963, on trial of the divorce action after which 
custody was awardt>d to the plaintiff. 
December 1963, on father's petition to modify with 
custody continued in the mother. 
May 1966, the father's third effort to obtain custody 
with the District Court certifying the case to the 
Juvenile Court. 
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Hearings before the ,Juvenile Court were had: 
It is to be noted that in every instance custody has 
heen awarded to the mother except for the period between 
April 15, 1963 and May 17, 1963 when that father had the 
child during the day and the mother during the weekend, 
and except for that period the father secreted the child 
between May 23 and June 6, 1966. 
This Court has repeatedly said these proceedings 
are equitable in nature and said in J olmson vs. Johnson, 
7 Utah 2d 263 323P2d19: 
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceedings, 
the proper adjudication of which is highly depend-
ent upon personal equations which the trial Court 
is in an advantaged position to appraise, he is 
allowed considerable latitude of discretion and his 
orders will not be disturbed unless it appears that 
there has been a plain abuse thereof." 
The District Court had four hearings and the .Juve-
nile Court two hearings in which to observe the parents, 
their motivation, sincerity, and c.andor. 
The repeated opportunities extended to the District 
Court to consider the ''personal equations'' together with 
the lack of any showing of abuse of discretion should 
persuade this Court not to disturb the orders regarding 
custody heretofore entered. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED 
COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS OF APPEAL IN CON-
NECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. 
The Appellant, from his answer and comiter-claim 
rhallenging the mother's fitness to have custody of the 
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child in question, has initiated three proceedings to 
change the custody awards and has taken the present 
appeal. This continued harrassment of the respondent 
has subjected her to continuous expense. 
Allowance of such fees is proper. See Dahlberg vs. 
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P 214 and Hendricks vs. 
Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P 2d 642. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Respondent urges that the appeal of the appellant. 
father be dismissed and that the award of custody made 
by the Juvenile Court be upheld. 
The Co·urt may and should award respondent counsel 
fees and appeal costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLENN W. ADAMS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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